WINNING
When it is recalled that on both occasions when British troops had been sent to Red River the War Office had moved them by Hudson Bay in preference to risking the use of the canoe route west from Lake Superior, the military shortcomings of the latter communication become obvious. 6 In 1857 Sir George Simpson expressed the opinion that it was "quite impracticable for any body of Troops.
•'7 Captain Palliser, who explored the country at the same period, was completely pessimistic concerning the possibility of effective connection with it by an all-British route; he thought that there were "no means of access to be recommended save those vi• the United States":
The direct route from England vi,• York Factory, and also that from Canada vi,• Lake Superior, are too tedious, difficult and expensive for the generality of settlers. The manner in which natural obstacles have isolated the country from all other British possessions in the East is a matter of considerable weight; indeed, it is the obstacle of the country, and one, I fear, almost beyond the remedies of art.
The egress and ingress to the settlement from the east is obviously by the Red River
Valley and through the States. s When, about 1856, Canadians began to turn their eyes towards the Hudson's Bay territories and to talk of their country's western destiny, their first care was to seek a solution for this problem which so many good judges regarded as insoluble. In 1857 the provincial government despatched an expedition "to examine the country between Lake Superior and the Red River of the North, with a view to determine the best route for opening a communication between that lake and the settlements on Red River." 9 These Canadian explorers, in striking contrast with Palliser, displayed a confidence and optimism worthy of pioneers of national expansion. They were unanimous in the opinion that a practicable communication could be established, though they differed on details. Professor Hind favoured a variant of the old North West Company route by the Pigeon River, lying for the most part directly upon the international boundary; •ø but the expedition's engineer, S. J. 6For documents concerning the movement of the Royal Canadian Rifles to and from Red River Settlement, and their work there during the years 1857-61, see Public Dawson, in a report published in 1859, advocated a line, beginning with a road from Thunder Bay to Dog Lake, which in its eastern section was well within Canadian territory. n This report was the origin of the so-called Dawson route, which played an important part in the drama of Canada's acquisition of the West.
As the great project of western expansion approached realization, the opening of this communication became a matter of immediate interest. Even before Confederation, the province of Canada made a small beginning, constructing six miles of road inland from Lake Superior at Fort William; and one of the early acts of the first Dominion ministry was to obtain a new report from Dawson, •2 and to commission him to undertake further explorations. The result was a modification of his project at the Lake Superior end. Now, in 1869, he proposed that the road here should connect with Lake Shebandowan instead of Dog Lake.
•3 The scheme was adopted by the government, and work on this road began in the same year under Dawson's own direction. At the far western extremity of the proposed communication, it had started even earlier. A plague of locusts had caused distress at Red River Settlement, and Ottawa now thought to provide employment there, and at the same time advance its own policy, by commencing a road to connect Fort Garry with the Lake of the Woods. Construction began in the autumn of 1868, and considerable progress was made during 1869. •4 Incidents arising out of this enterprise contributed to the feeling of mistrust among the inhabitants of the settlement which led to the disturbances which broke out in the latter year. •* The Dawson route, now actually becoming a reality, stretched nReport on the Exploration of the Country between Lake Superior and the Red River Settlement, and between the Latter Place and the ,4ssiniboine and Saskatchewan (Toronto, 1859). George Gladman was director of the 1857 expedition, with Hind and Dawson under him as geologist and surveyor respectively. In 1858 Gladman was dispensed with, and the expedition organized in two divisions, one under Hind, the other under Dawson. In 1861, at the time of the withdrawal of the Royal Canadian Rifles from Red River, Gladman tried to prevail on the Canadian government to open a route by Lake Superior, the particular line which he favoured being that by Whitefish Lake (Public Archives of Canada, Series C, vol. 36z•, pp. 319-38, Gladman to GovernorGeneral's Secretary, Feb. 22, 1861).
•2Canada, Sessional Papers, 1867-8, no. 81, "Report on the Line of Route between Lake Superior and the Red River Settlement." Cf. the recapitulation in the annual report of the Minister of Public Works for the year ending June 30, 1869 (ibid., 1870, no. 2, pp. z•z• if.).
•aCanada, Sessional Papers, 1869, no. zt2, report dated May 1, 1869, reprinted in ibid., 1870, no. 12.
•4Canada, Sessional Papers, 1870, no. 2, pp. z•z•.5; and see reports of Dawson and John A. Snow in ibid., no. 12.
•sj. j. Hargrave, Red River (Montreal, 1871), 4z•9 if.; Chester Martin in Canada and Its Provinces (23 vols., Toronto, 1914-17), XIX, 68-9. for 452.05 miles from Prince Arthur's Landing (now Port Arthur) to Fort Garry. It consisted of three main sections: the Thunder Bay road, 45 miles long, from Prince Arthur's to Shebandowan; a central section of mixed land and water transport comprising "twelve portages and thirteen disconnected reaches of water of various extent," ending with the journey across Rainy Lake and down Rainy River to the Lake of the Woods, and across the latter to its north-west angle; and finally, the Fort Garry road, 95 miles long, running thence overland to Red River Settlement. •6 For rather more than one-third of the whole distance (from Lac Lacroix, east of Rainy Lake, to the north-west angle) it was practically coincident with the American border. From the beginning, Dawson looked forward to incorporating railways into the scheme; his report of 1869 envisages the conversion of the two terminal waggon roads into rail lines, and the improvement of the intervening navigation by means of locks and dams, to permit the use of steamers;while he perceived the possibility of making his project part of a communication with the Pacific, to be effected either by a complete railway from Fort Garry or by combining navigation on the Saskatchewan and a railway through the mountains. He recognized, however, that what the immediate circumstances demanded was a "preliminary communication" utilizing boats and waggons. •7 Before even this could be opened, trouble broke out at Red River; and at a time when the Thunder Bay road was only nicely begun, and that through the swamps west of the Lake of the Woods was in a still more elemental state, Canada faced the possibility of having to send an expeditionary force to Fort Garry. Strategy in British North America had always been primarily a problem in communications; but this campaign promised to be dominated by this factor to an extent previously unknown.
II
The Red River expedition of 1870 was necessary to the future of the West: not, we have suggested above, so much because of the feelings of the settlers (for the worst domestic problems, which could have been obviated by a little foresight in the first place, were solved by the conciliatory policy embodied in the Manitoba Act passed before the troops moved) as of the danger of interference from American territory. It was not likely that the United States government would actually provoke war in order to seize the Hudson's Bay Company's lands, though had it chosen to do so they could scarcely have been defended. It had, however, opportunities for less direct action which might produce the same result. John A. Macdonald, summing up Ottawa's apprehensions, wrote on January 28, 1870, "It is quite evident to me... that the United States Government are resolved to do all they can, short of war, to get possession of the western territory and we must take immediate and vigorous steps to counteract them. "•a We know that there were grounds for fear. The United States Senate had already shown its interest by asking President Grant for information on the Red River crisis; somewhat later, its leading anglophobe, Zach Chandler, introduced a resolution requesting him to send agents thither to treat with the inhabitants for annexation. On December 30, 1869, Grant's Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, appointed James W. Taylor, a Minnesotan of annexationist views, a secret special agent charged with investigation of the Canadian situation in general and the Red River question in particular? Fish himself clearly hoped that the halfbreeds' resistance to Canadian authority could be turned to the advantage of the United States. At this time he was pressing the British government, through its minister at Washington, to concede the independence of Canada as a prelude to annexation and the means of facilitating "the settlement of all other questions between the two governments"; 2ø and the movement at Fort Garry appeared to fit neatly into the design. Not only did he use it as an argument in interviews with Thornton, but on January 14, 1870, he instructed J. L. Motley at the American legation in London to lose no opportunity of sounding British statesmen on the separation of the colonies from the mother country, of "indicating the facts which seem to make such separation a necessity," and in particular of giving discreet encouragement to the idea • In Minnesota such ideas had a very definite appeal, and there were, perhaps, fewer scruples about methods there than in Washington. As early as March, 1868,. the state legislature had memorialized the national government on the proposed transfer of the Company's territories to Canada, announcing that it would rejoice in "the cession of Northwest British America to the United States"; 2• now, on January 15, 1870, one of the Minnesota senators, Alexander Ramsey, dropped in on Grant with the suggestion that if "about $25,000" could be sent to the insurgents at Fort Garry, "they would be able to maintain themselves." Fish, who was present, remarked that there was no appropriation from which the money could be taken, "and besides we should not use money in that way"; and the President, who could be thoroughly punctilious on occasion, agreed with him.
•'a Minnesota newspaper editorials indicated the trend of western aspiration.
One comment ran:
The true policy of our government is to preserve an armed neutrality, and while refusing transit to British troops, to send at once a strong garrison to Pembina as a force of observation, and to defend our own frontier against the eventualities of the revolution.
Consequences of profound importance hinge upon the policy which our government may pursue--which, if no false step be taken, will in less than three years insure the annexation to the United States of the whole immense region from Lake Superior and Hudson's Bay to the Pacific, and from the international boundary to the North Pole, and in no long time thereafter Canada and the lower provinces [ that the President desired "that no military expedition of any foreign power, whether of troops or of boats, intended for the purpose of taking part in any military or warlike expedition, or of warlike material, be allowed to pass through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal without express instructions to that effect from the government at Washington." All Canadian traffic through the canal was then suspended. The Governor-General now pointed out to Thornton that Canada had always treated the United States generously with respect to her own canals, even permitting armed revenue cutters to pass through them to the Atlantic during the Civil War; he added that no munitions of war, "not even tents," would be sent through the canal. Thornton took the matter up with the State Department, basing his argument on the fact that the expedition to Red River had no hostile character, but was being sent merely "with the object of maintaining good order in that district, and of insuring the regular and harmonious establishment of the new government." On May 16, in consequence, the Governor of Michigan was informed that the President did not desire to oppose the passage of Canadian vessels "so long as they do not carry troops and munitions of war. "34 The difficulty, however, had necessitated employing labourers intended for the Thunder Bay road on the portage road at the Sault, and Dawson, who was working hard to get the expedition forward, estimated that this had delayed it "for at least a fortnight or three weeks. "aS The issue of the expedition undoubtedly proved that the Dawson route, however limited its commercial possibilities, was a valuable political and military asset to the new nation. And it must be remembered that in 1870 the contemplated improvements upon it had hardly commenced. The troops themselves had to help complete the Thunder Bay road, and even so its deficiencies compelled resort to water transport by the Kaministiquia; the troops themselves had to clear the portage paths; and since the Fort Garry road was not yet passable the expedition had to move by the much longer and more toilsome water route by the Winnipeg River. The actual number of portages between Lake Shebandowan and Fort Garry was forty-seven? Not the least of the expedition's triumphs was the demonstration that heavy boats •9Ibid., no. 9, pp. c-cii, cvii-cxi. On Fort Osborne, J. C. Hamilton, The Prairie Province (Toronto, 1876), 38.
•OCanada, Sessional Papers, 1873, no. 9, pp. cix-cx.
•Ibid., 1874, no. 7, pp. 35-7.
•-Ibid., 1877, no. 7, pp. 49-51. •9At the same time, the strength of the artillery detachment was somewhat increased. Robertson Ross' report ("Reconnaissance of the North West Provinces and Indian Territories of the Dominion of Canada...") is in Canada, Sessional Papers, 1878, no. 9, pp. cvii-cxxvii. There are few more interesting documents in Canadian history.
Selby-Smyth observed, the fact that the garrison was seldom called upon to act was no criterion of its usefulness; its
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West. It was quite clear now that conditions there were going from bad to worse; settlement of the prairies, in the existing state of things, was impossible, and unless something was done it was even possible that the country might yet be lost. ß A few weeks after Robertson Ross had made his report, Lord Duff.erin was able to inform the Colonial Office that something was being done. 
It
